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E-Commerce Security: The Birth of Technology the Death of 
Common Sense? 
Amidst the clamber to join the high-tech world of e-commerce, companies have 
neglected to apply common sense to their endeavours. It is arguably the lack of 
common sense rather than the lack of sophistication of e-commerce security which 
potentially will scupper e-trade development. 
As Erma Bombeck once remarked, “[i]t seemed rather incongruous that in a society of 
supersophisticated communication, we often suffer from a shortage of listeners.”1 
Butler has argued that “[a]lthough business was quick to recognise the advantages to 
be gained from improving connections to the outside world, a corresponding 
awareness of the unique vulnerabilities of such enhanced connectivity has been far 
slower to develop.”2 The lack of awareness can of course be attributed to the 
unavoidable fact that businesses‟ primary motivation is the creation of profit. 
Estimates
3
 by The Gartner Group, for example, that e-tailing will grow to account for 
between 5-7% of total retail sales in North America by 2004 from the 1% figure it 
represented in 1999 serve only to fuel corporate profit drives. Analyst firm Forrester 
suggests
4
 that worldwide Internet commerce will be worth $6,790 billion (circa 
£4,620billion) by 2004. The bulk of trade is likely to emerge from the USA, but, as 
Bennett notes, “…[the USA‟s] dominance will decline as European and Asian-Pacific 
countries expand their trading.”5 With the advent of m-commerce (infra at p.16), even 
that large rise will arguably pale into insignificance. Given such financial prospects, 
corporations may simply perceive that the delay caused by implementing e-commerce 
protection simply reduces their potential profit margin. 
That corporations lack the requisite awareness is evidenced by the number of viral 
infections and the effectiveness of denial of service attacks their systems have been 
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subject to. As Millar has noted recently, denial of service attacks “…are the lead-lined 
cosh of hacking..”6. Numbering some 4,000 a week, such attacks have become, as 
Millar puts it, “..the weapon of choice for malicious hackers intent on inflicting most 
damage with the minimum of time and effort”7. The Internet provides the company 
with the means to contact and do business with the whole world. Butler maintains, 
however, that “…the downside to this ability is that other people are equally capable 
of reaching back into the company in the same way.”8 In January 1999, one individual 
stole information on more than 485,000 credit cards from an e-commerce site
9
. Some 
two weeks after that, data from 300,000 credit cards was stolen from the CD Universe 
web site
10
. In February 2000, a number of major e-commerce companies (including 
Amazon.com and Yahoo!) were subject to sustained denial of service attacks in which 
their web sites were so inundated with maliciously motivated requests for data that the 
sites‟ servers overloaded and could not deal with legitimate requests for information 
for a number of hours. The Love Bug
11
 was described
12
 as the most damaging and 
most widespread virus outbreak ever. Indeed, losses sustained in terms of lost work 
hours have been estimated to be in region of $10 billion. The Love Bug was opened 
as an innocuous looking e-mail attachment. The bug installed itself on the computers‟ 
hard drives, replaced itself with a copy of itself and sent infected e-mails to the 
addresses logged in the Outlook Express folder. The fact that Microsoft Windows 
runs on 9 out of 10 computers
13
 made the bug particularly powerful and points, at an 
early juncture, the lack of corporations‟ common sense in placing their business eggs 
into one technological basket. 
 Ironically, Apple computers who have escaped the majority of destructive virus 
attacks because they do not operate using Windows software are now offering 
Microsoft compatible packages with their products. Market competition seems to 
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have overcome their common sense based logic and increased their future 
vulnerability to viral attack.  
The security of e-mail is becoming an increasingly serious issue given that it is both a 
preferred mode of global communication and a common and simple vehicle for the 
introduction and dissemination of viruses and trojans. A virus has been likened, by 
Armstrong
14
,  to a burglar who breaks into a house, steals the contents and then 
leaves. A trojan (named after the famous Trojan horse of Greek mythology), on the 
other hand, is a burglar who breaks into a house repeatedly because he has established 
a way of gaining entry to the house without the homeowner ever becoming aware of 
the fact. 
It is the convenience and user-friendly nature of e-mails which lies at the heart of the 
problem. As Butler notes, “[t]he rapid nature of e-mail exchanges seems to almost 
stun many users into a state of complacency in its use…”15  It appears that many 
corporations‟ security warnings regarding, for example, the opening of attachments, 
go unheeded by employees and thus provide a vehicle by which viruses can infiltrate 
and disrupt corporations. 
In October 2000, Microsoft was hacked using a QAZ Trojan horse. As with all 
Trojans, it entered the company‟s network as an ordinary e-mail attachment. Once the 
attachment was opened, the Trojan opened a „back door‟ and allowed a blueprint for 
new software under development to be examined by the hacker. Norfolk maintains 
that “[t] he growing use of the Internet and almost universal use of certain software 
packages has greatly increased the threat from Trojans.”16 
The US National Infrastructure Protection Centre [sic] revealed
17
 in December 2000 
that it had traced several virus attacks likely to coincide with Christmas. Cluley of 
Sophos argues
18
 that hackers exploit the feelings of Christmas spirit amongst 
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employees. He maintains that “[j]okes circulated by e-mail from system to system are 
exactly what people want, and virus writers specialise in attractive festive attachments 
such as screen savers, tunes and jokes.”19 
There is strong evidence that virus writers are getting more and more inventive and 
more and more technically proficient. Foresight [a group of experts from business, 
science, government and the voluntary sector which examines future trends] have 
argued that a “..clear danger.. is being at the mercy of a small technologically 
knowledgeable elite.”20 The increased skill-base of such hackers easily exploits the 
gullibility and lack of awareness of a number of e-mail users. A good example of this 
is the Naked Wife Trojan horse virus. It attached itself to an e-mail as 
„NakedWife.exe‟ and the e-mail purported to come from a person that the recipient of 
the e-mail had just e-mailed. In the body of the message, the e-mail read “My wife 
never looked like that, best wishes (sender‟s name). It looked entirely genuine 
therefore. If opened however, the virus deleted critical system files whilst the 
recipient waited for the naked wife picture to load!! 
Viruses such as the Love Bug, Anna Kournikova (similar to the Naked Wife virus 
except that it promised a photograph of the eponymous tennis star instead) and Naked 
Wife were totally preventable had companies ensured that an attachment procedure 
had been implemented and adhered to. The success of the viruses “..demonstrates that 
IT departments‟ non-adherence to common-sense security procedures is 
widespread.”21 
Cluley estimated that there are now some 4,000 new viruses each month, thirty of 
which go live on computer systems.
22
 
Cluley notes an additional danger of lax e-mail protocol, which is that “..viruses 
contained in e-mails encrypted for security purposes will themselves be encrypted and 
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so will not be recognisable. This means the viruses that would otherwise be trapped 
will cross the company‟s firewall.”23 [A firewall (named after the barrier that stops a 
fire from spreading from a car engine into the passenger compartment) is the name 
given to hardware, software or procedures that provide access control to a company‟s 
computers]. Ironically, of course, businesses maintain that encryption is essential for 
their site and customer security. 
Williams (of Axent Technologies) maintains that “[h]ackers do what they do for 
different reasons. Some do it for financial reasons. Some do it for financial reward, 
some for the intellectual challenge, some for the kudos within a certain society of 
hackers, others have political ends. It is up to the IT manager to determine which 
security threat group his or her company falls under and recommend installation of 
the appropriate security measures to combat the threat.”24 
Barrett suggests that this anti-hacker security programme may become easier in light 
of the fact that hacking itself has become easier. He suggests that “[t]he challenge, the 
fun, the game of hacking has passed, replaced by the thoughtless, aimless and amateur 
execution of tools written by others to exploit vulnerabilities.”25 Indeed, Foresight 
argue that “[a] general assumption about the future has been that the average 
individual will know more and more how to use technology but understand less and 
less how it works.”26 
Barrett argues therefore
27
, that, if hacking is carried out by the less intellectually 
aware using widely available tools and techniques, a company need only learn to 
counter those tools and techniques and then incorporate those new-found solutions 
into their prospective security policy and procedures. Foresight have argued in this 
regard that “[i]nformation about how to compromise a system will be available more 
quickly and to more people. As the lingua franca of the internet, sites or 
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communication in English may disproportionately be targets for crime and 
disruption.”28  
More generally, it is argued that the problem of security owes much to the perception 
of security as an issue. Butler suggests that when debating security issues, “...people 
mistakenly persist in acting as though it is a problem that can be solved by the 
adoption of a solution.”29 Thus, Erwin argues, companies put their faith in nework 
intrusion products like firewalls. He suggests, however, that attempting to protect a 
company from every possible threat is “..a bit like trying to catch the Niagara Falls in 
a paper cup.”30 
Arguably, security is best addressed by adopting a position of inevitability, that is, 
“..understanding that things will go wrong, and that damage control measure must be 
in place to deal with failures when they occur.”31 From that position, the norm soon 
becomes one of creating a process of security.  As Harold suggests, “[s]ecurity must 
be proactive to be effective and not simply based on reacting to the latest 
vulnerability.”32 
Ironically, given the importance of security in an environment in which security is 
perceived to be a very real threat, it is a function routinely delegated to already hard-
pressed network or system administrators. As Netsec maintains, however, 
“[i]mplementing effective in-house network security…requires a number of distinct 
skills that are almost never found in a single person…”33 
This lack of prioritisation and lack of expertise may then be exacerbated by naïve 
utilisation of those systems and procedures that may be in place. As Netsec suggests, 
“[b]uilding security-critical devices on top of proprietary, insecure operating systems 
will always create an opportunity for hackers.”34 
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In some respects it is the required convenience of a corporation‟s operating systems 
that constitutes its self-created and promoted Achilles Heel. 
Netsec confirm that on the whole, “..operating systems are designed to provide 
general functionality and ease of use.”35 Thus, “…networks are built first and security 
applied later.”36 
Yapp, of the Control Risk Group, maintains
37
 that 80% of security breaches are 
caused by a company‟s own staff. As Goodwin argues, “[d]isgruntled former 
employees, people who are careless with their passwords, and dishonest staff with a 
little IT knowledge, can be far more devastating to a business than an external 
attack.”38 A survey39 carried out this year by Pentasafe Security Technology has 
found that organisations typically spend 80% of their security budget protecting 
themselves against external threats, and only 20% on implementing internal security 
despite the fact that 80% of security breaches come from within companies. The 
Department of Trade and Industry in the UK reported this year that only 14% of UK 
companies had an information security policy.
40
 
Even if a password is not written down, Yapp argues
41
 that most can be established 
with a little deduction given that the apparent norm of password selection is to focus 
on names of family members, personal telephone numbers, favourite sports teams, 
etc. Erwin notes
42
 that one of the most common passwords is, „password‟. The danger 
of over-reliance upon passwords as an essential part of a corporation‟s security 
measures may be seen most poignantly in Erwin‟s citation43 of a merchant bank that 
this year laid off 5,000 staff without deactivating their passwords. Research revealed 
that 40% of the ex-employees had entered the network after their forced departure.  
Another more infamous yet illustrative example of weak security infrastructure is the 
Barings Bank collapse in 1995. Although perceptually the bank was brought down by 
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one individual‟s reckless and unauthorised trading, in reality it was a range of 
ineffectual and uncontrolled systems which facilitated the rogue trading. 
In July 1992, Leeson, the trader in question, instructed a computer clerk in Singapore 
to create an error account (number 88888, hereafter the „error account‟). He then 
instructed a systems engineer to amend the computer software so as to prevent the 
existence or contents of the error account from being divulged to London.  The fact 
that Leeson was able to instigate these changes without fear of contradiction or 
adverse consequences, is the first point of concern. 
Leeson‟s role for Barings Bank in Singapore had been to execute orders on behalf of 
colleagues based in Japan. Leeson then began to sell options without authority from 
Barings. An option provides the interested party with the right, but not the obligation, 
to buy or sell a set quantity (usually of currencies or securities) at some stage in the 
future in return for payment of a premium. 
If the price rises in the interim, however, the loss can soon overshadow the original 
premium. This is what happened to Leeson but he simply hid the losses in the error 
account. Like a gambler is often wont to do, Leeson sold yet more options in a vain 
attempt to reduce his existing losses.  
As far as Barings were concerned, Leeson was, judging by the amount of premiums 
he provided them with, a raging success. In reality, he was bringing them closer and 
closer to collapse. By December 1994 he had accumulated losses on the error account 
of some £208 million, and by February 1995, the accumulated losses on the error 
account amounted to £830 million
44. Drummond argues that “[s]ecurity frequently 
involves designing systems of control to prevent unauthorised access. Baring‟s 
collapse suggests that organisations may have more to fear from authorised users 
apparently going about their daily business.”45 
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The key problem for Barings lay in both its weak operational control and its weak 
application of its computer systems and processes. 
Leeson controlled the trading office and the office in which documentation relating to 
his trading was processed. This lack of effective segregation allowed Leeson to 
disguise his losses.  
As Drummond argues, “[p]rotecting systems from insider abuse is difficult because 
organisations require control and flexibility.”46 
Leeson exploited Barings‟ lack of control and not only created the error account but 
ensured that its contents never came to the attention of London. Drummond notes that 
“[r]isk assessment typically concentrates on control points with greatest vulnerability 
and potential loss.”47 
Leeson‟s ability to achieve his deception lay in the simple fact that Barings never 
anticipated his actions. Ironically, in 1992, Leeson had been assigned to a team in 
Tokyo charged with investigating allegations of internal fraud. As Drummond 
confirms, “…the least consequential parts of the system are potentially highly 
vulnerable to abuse precisely because they are unguarded.”48 
It was ironic, therefore, that despite his best endeavours, details of Leeson‟s error 
account did in fact reach London. In other words, the Barings Bank software had 
worked. The lack of control of the system, however, enabled Leeson‟s actions to 
continue to go unnoticed. The system in London could not correlate the contracts in 
the error account with existing account numbers and so, rather than raising a query, 
simply placed them in a suspense file. The suspense file was only noticed after 
Barings had collapsed. The suspense file should have been routinely and regularly 
audited. It was not. 
“Curiousity killed the cat”. Lack of curiousity killed Barings. 
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As Drummond puts it, “[f]raud invariably generates evidence of its existence.”49 
Barings‟ systems allowed evidence to be disguised and hidden and, even when in the 
open, ignored the evidence because it did not correlate with existing account details. 
The lack of correlation, if nothing else, should have generated a concerned and active 
response from Barings.  As Drummond notes, “[t]o neglect such clues is to behave 
like the drunk who looks for his car keys not where he left them, but under the lamp  
post because the light is good.”50 
The same ignorance of security protocol and the implicit trust placed in employees 
evidenced in the Barings fiasco can also be detected in the recent case involving FBI 
spy, Robert Hanssen. Hanssen helped to set up the FBI‟s Intelligence Investigative 
System into which agents placed the names, addresses etc of their Soviet targets. This 
gave Hanssen access to the true names of every FBI intelligence source in New York. 
He also worked with the intelligence specialists who installed bugs and cameras to 
watch over Soviet officials. Thus, he knew where every watching and listening device 
was placed. Aside from that, he was generally very inquisitive about every activity 
going on around him. A former colleague simply remarked that “I just figured he was 
nosy.”51When he was posted to Washington Hanssen was given increasingly 
important assignments which, according to McGeary, allowed him to “..poke 
unnoticed into virtually every corner of government intelligence, surveying a 
complete library of sources, methods, techniques, targets, plus secret-operations plans 
and analytical assessments.”52 The FBI trusted Robert Hanssen and therefore mistook 
his insatiable interest in the Agency‟s activities for keenness rather than espionage. 
Effective security (in terms of both systems and processes) will never come cheap, 
and inevitably, therefore, financial commitment may also become an issue for 
corporations. Netsec cogently argues that “[b]udgets for network security are usually 
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owned and managed by the people who are responsible for functionality. In times of 
limited budgets, functionality always wins at the cost of security.”53 
Xephon indicates that corporations have a disturbingly lax attitude to security. Their 
report
54
 examined the attitudes of IT managers worldwide regarding security issues 
and e-business success. One third of respondents said that security concerns slowed 
down progress of their firms‟ e-business development. One in six IT managers felt 
that e-business was awarded greater importance than security matters. 
An exacerbation of the afore-mentioned factors may lie in the tendency of  
corporations to succumb to the pressures of joining the world of e-commerce at the 
expense of creating an adequately tested security system.  
The Gartner Group reported
55
 that half of all small and medium sized businesses 
would fall victim to internet attacks by 2003. Smaller firms are driven to e-commerce 
conformity but lack the technical or financial wherewithal to do so safely. 
The Gartner Group argues that smaller companies tend to rely upon part-time staff, or 
staff without appropriate qualifications to run enterprise servers. In addition, they 
depend upon their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide their security. This 
could open up their partners to intrusion. If, as seems likely, small firms are hacked or 
subject to viruses, they could, as Cyrano predicts
56
, become a weak link in the 
arguably already tenuous e-market, rendering larger firms vulnerable to attack. 
Mannion argues that “[s]ecurity is only as strong as its weakest link. It should be kept 
in mind where business to business links are created.”57 Ironically, even if a large 
corporation has an effective security system in place, such corporations “…are now 
linked to suppliers and customers who do not see security as a main business 
objective. A hack attack could be launched through one of these sites.”58 
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Security, as Barings discovered to its cost, should be contained within a process of 
overarching security not merely or primarily within a package containing an anti-viral 
device. Mitnick suggests that to assume that the installation of a firewall will protect 
the company form a full range of security threats is naïve in the extreme. Specifically, 
“[t]hat assumption creates a false sense of security, and having a false sense of 
security is worse than having no security at all.”59 
PowerGen, a UK electricity supplier, made a number of elementary errors in the 
process of security which served to undermine any security systems they had in 
operation. They held files of customer records on their Web server rather than on a 
separate server. They failed to encrypt the data contained on those files. As a 
consequence, bank details of 2,500 customers were accessible via their standard 
website. 
The Association of British Insurers predicts
60
 that cyber crime will increase 
substantially in the next twenty years. They maintain that access to information is 
very much a double-edged sword since “[w]e are increasingly reliant on the smooth 
flow of information. Any disruption is, at best inconvenient, and, at worst, life 
threatening.”61 
The perceived inconvenience of obeying a system of security as it relates to 
communication has led to convenience above security becoming the driving force. 
Consequently, public key infrastructure (PKI) systems with digital certificates and 
digital signatures have promised to protect the sanctity of online communications. 
[Public Key Cryptograpy utilises pairs of huge numbers used to encode and decode 
messages. One number (the public key) is published. The second number is a private 
key kept secret. One key is used to encode the message, the second key to decode it.] 
Uptake of PKI systems is on the increase. 
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It has been argued, however, that “…digital signatures bind documents to computers, 
not to people - and this can be a security weakness.”62 Foresight have argued that 
“[e]lectronic signatures offer two potential routes for those seeking to commit a 
crime; either personification of a person/signee…or the forgery of the actual 
signature…”63 
In ordinary, land-based transactions, it is argued that hand-written signatures are not 
automatically acceptable for important transactions and that notarised signatures are 
used instead. In addition, of course, it is an accepted principle of ordinary consumer 
dealing that the credit card holder‟s signature is witnessed by the person they are 
purchasing goods from. 
The US National Notary Association argues that the same caution should be exercised 
in relation to digital signatures. They suggest that “[a]s industry becomes more digital, 
it becomes possible to reproduce and take on the identity of another (person).”64 
Summers notes that “[t]he Internet permits a risk-free anonymity that has emboldened 
a new generation of forgers and identity thieves.”65 According to Summers66, 
complaints of identity theft rose from less than 40,000 in 1992 to 750,000 in 1999. 
The importance of basic corporate systems security becomes self-evident when the 
propensity for breaching those systems is revealed and recognised. 
Most web-based companies routinely employ „cookies‟. These are small (4K) pieces 
of information sent from the web server to the browser and then stored on the user‟s 
hard disk. When that user re-visits the site in question, the cookie is automatically 
returned to the server. The cookie allows the user to be recognised as a former visitor 
to the site. It facilitates a cyber form of the greeting a loyal customer might receive in 
a land-based store. In theory, being greeted by name on a website encourages repeat 
client patronage. 
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If a bug is introduced, however, the cookie can become the cookie monster, a 
potential threat to the consumer. 
In May 2000, for example, a flaw in Microsoft‟s Internet Explorer emerged which 
allowed any server to read cookies belonging to other sites. This, known as the „Open 
Cookie Jar‟67, allowed hackers to monitor browsing habits. 
Microsoft then admitted, in October 2000, that there was a security weakness which 
allowed hackers to read and execute files on web sites powered by its Internet 
Information Services (IIS) software by simply requesting a specific web address. 
The afore-mentioned difficulties over security breaches may be categorised as what 
Schneier refers to as „syntactic‟68 attacks, namely active exploitation of software and 
hardware vulnerabilities, gaining unauthorised access to sites and organising denial of 
service attacks.  
He argues that the next wave of attacks will be „semantic‟69 in nature - exploiting 
what he terms “human-computer interaction.”70 His illustrative example concerns the 
firm of Emulex. Mark Jakob posted a false press release to a service called Internet 
Wire. The release falsely maintained that Emulex‟s Chief Executive was stepping 
down and that the company needed to restate its earnings. Within hours, the 
company‟s stock price fell from $70 to $40 per share. Luckily, the share price did 
recover once the hoax had been discovered but the cost to investors was $110 
million.
71
 
In April 1999, visitors to an online financial news message board operated by Yahoo 
got a scoop on PairGain, a telecommunications company based in California. An e-
mail posted on the message board under the title “Buyout News” said that the 
company was being taken over by an Israeli company. The e-mail also provided a link 
to the website of the Bloomberg News Service which contained a detailed news story 
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of the takeover. As news of the takeover spread the company‟s publicly traded stock 
shot up by more than 30% and the trading volume to seven times its usual rate. The 
entire story was false and the website was not Bloomberg‟s but a counterfeit copy. 
When news of the hoax spread, the price of the stock dropped sharply and caused 
massive losses to investors who had bought stock at artificially inflated prices.
72
 The 
Office of Internet Enforcement set up by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has reported similar cases of bogus company takeover scams (also known as 
„scalping‟, „pumping‟ and „dumping‟ or „ramping‟. 
The security issues described thus far relate only to fixed computer systems, 
controllable, however ineptly, in situ. 
The flaws identified in processes and systems will arguably pale into insignificance if 
m-commerce begins to take effective shape. M-commerce
73
 refers to the buying and 
selling of goods and services through wireless handheld devices such as cellular 
telephone and personal digital assistants (PDAs). M-commerce effectively provides 
for access to the Internet without the necessity of plugging directly into a computer 
terminal. The key technology for m-commerce is Wireless Application Technology 
(WAP). M-commerce will potentially affect a wide range of industries
74
 including 
financial services (including mobile banking, when customers use handheld devices to 
access their accounts and pay bills, and brokerage services where customers can see 
stock quotes and trade), telecommunications, in which bill payment can be conducted 
on the handheld device, and service/retail, where customers can place orders and pay 
for those orders from their handheld devices. 
It has been predicted that m-commerce will be launched firmly once third generation 
(3G) cellular services become routinely available. 3G services will provide a 
permanent internet connection and data throughput will be higher, matching at least 
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today‟s 56kbps modems. International Data Corporation argue75 that the number of 
wireless devices with two-way access to the Internet is expected to increase to 61.5 
million by 2003. 
It is suggested that companies will be able to offer services and products to consumers 
via mobile handsets in much the same way as they can over the web today. 
The Gartner Group predicts that the number of mobile connections to the internet will 
top one billion world-wide by 2003. It further predicts that the consequential global 
value of transactions by mobile device will rise to $1.8 trillion by 2005
76
 (assuming 
an ideal business environment). As Armstrong notes, “[b]usinesses, enthusiastically 
examining mobile commerce…are incessantly looking for ways to widen their reach 
and fatten revenues.”77  
In order to be as successful as these predictions, however, the mobile phones and 
PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants) will have to be extremely rapid and efficient in 
data transfer and retrieval. The problem with wireless technology, according to 
Chen
78
,  is of course that they have a limited memory. In terms of marketability, as 
with ordinary landbased computer systems, manufacturers will dedicate memory to 
efficient utility rather than efficient, but memory depleting, encryption and 
authentication systems. If cell  phones and PDAs are stolen (which, given the general 
propensity for thieves to take ordinary office based computers, will be exacerbated by 
the smaller size of m-devices) then the absence of effective security measures might 
be devestating for the individual and his/her corporation if those devices fall into even 
partly competent hands. 
Medina‟s survey79 of 3,000 people found that almost no handheld owners used anti-
virus protection even though 81% of the sample stated that they were worried about 
future viruses that could infect their mobile devices. 
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It is suggested that the threats to m-commerce will increase in proportion to the speed 
and higher bandwidths of the mobile devices. They will of necessity be able, for 
example, to receive and re-distribute e-mail attachments. These are of course perfect 
vehicles for Trojan horses back into the company. In June 2000, experts intercepted 
Timofonica (a virus similar to the Love Bug) designed to attack cell phones with text 
capability and in September 2000, experts warned of the Liberty Crack virus, a 
PalmPilot Trojan horse that deleted files.  
Anti-virus company, Trend Micro, argues that as “…mobile devices with always-on 
connectivity become widespread, we will see more and more viruses targeted at 
[mobile] platforms.”80 
In terms of technological ability currently available, Robinson notes
81
 that phones 
which can be used in all countries pose a potential threat. Researchers have found a 
design problem in GSM phones. The GSM (Global System for Mobile 
Communications) is the most popular mobile phone system in the world, with 65% of 
the total digital market. GSM includes a facility to encrypt data travelling across the 
network. Western Europe, however, cannot export encryption products to certain 
countries (for example, those against whom there are UN sanctions) and so the default 
version of the GSM protocol does not use encryption. 
It is possible to build an unauthorised „base station‟ (the hardware which 
communicates with the handset) that jams the signal from the real station and forces 
the mobile phone to connect with it. The false base station tricks the encryption ready 
non-European handset into believing that the message is being sent from a foreign 
country, e.g. Iraq, in which encryption may not be used. Consequently, the message 
remains unencrypted and the open message is received by the false station. This so-
called „Man in the Middle (MITMA) attack allows the false station to intercept 
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messages between the real station and the handset without either being able to detect 
it. Even with this scenario, those who will profit from the upsurge in m-commerce 
insist that it is not a security issue. James Moran, fraud and security director at the 
GSM Association argued that building such an interception device would require 
considerable technical skill
82. Furthermore, he noted that “[w]e know about it as a 
technical issue, but we haven‟t seen it demonstrated.”83 In other words, we‟ll just wait 
and see. By that time of course it will be too late. As this view is expressed by a 
company with a vested interest in establishing that there is little current threat to GSM 
phones it is understandable even if still not acceptable. More worrying, perhaps, is the 
fact that some anti-virus firms have suggested that the fears expressed by Trend Micro 
(supra, at p.18) are premature. As Sophos, for example, noted, “[v]iruses for mobile 
devices are easy to create but they don‟t spread well. There may be a need for 
protection on wireless products in the future, but not yet.”84  Similarly, Kroll (director 
of security for Finjan Software) argued (in March this year) that the threat of mobile-
specific viruses was several years away. As he put it, “[v]irus writers gravitate to what 
is easiest and effective. Why do something through a PalmPilot when you can go 
directly to a PC?”85 Such ineffectual, unimaginative and non-lateral short-term 
thinking, which would have consigned the Wright brothers to rapid obscurity, will 
inevitably result in long-term terminal failure. 
A survey conducted by BindView
86
 noted that only 12% of a thousand companies 
surveyed had a policy regarding communications over mobile networks. Twenty-
seven percent said employees used notebook PCs at client premises and 37% said 
staff worked from home via remote access to the corporate network. This, according 
to BindView, “..opens up communications to hackers who could access cached user 
names and passwords.”87 Finally, 53% of managers said their IT department often had 
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no idea where company laptops were and that when in employees‟ homes, most were 
lent to friends or flatmates
88
. It is somewhat ironic perhaps, that the QAZ trojan attack 
upon Microsoft (mentioned supra at p.3) is alleged
89
 to have been perpetrated via a 
Microsoft employee‟s home computer connected to the network. 
A survey in 2000
90
 of risk managers in large corporations in the US and Europe 
revealed that “[b]usinesses do not adequately understand the risks posed by 
technology, have difficulty identifying potential risks and lack the tools to manage 
them effectively..”91 
More precisely, although computer/internet risk was the number one concern of 
European companies and the number two concern of US companies, only 30% of the 
former and 25% of the latter had formal management structures in place to manage 
technology risk. Only 60% of US companies and 56% of European companies had 
implemented employee training programmes as part of their programmes to manage 
security risk. Furthermore, about 75% of US executives and 60% of European 
executives said their employees had only a “fair” or “poor” understanding of 
technology risks. 
Finally, the issues of security now need to be placed within the context of 
globalisation. As Lovaas has noted, “[t]he global nature of e-commerce, varying legal 
systems and the speed with which new innovations are brought to market further 
complicate the challenges facing companies today, leading many firms into uncharted 
waters of liability risks as well as those which affect their revenue streams.”92 
Foresight, similarly, have noted that “[a]s the global reliance upon interconnected 
computer systems increases, so will the need to instigate protective measures against 
failure and malicious attacks.”93 
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There is a constant, even if laudable, pressure from organisations such as the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) for e-commerce 
development. In their recent (January 2001) Progress Report on the OECD‟s Work on 
Electronic Commerce they argued that “[e]lectronic commerce is a central element in 
the OECD‟s vision of the tremendous potential that our networked world now 
holds…”94 
Ironically, they posit that “[t]rust is central to any commercial transaction. Developing 
new kinds of commercial activities in the electronic environment largely hinges on 
assuring consumers and businesses that their use of network services is secure, 
reliable and verifiable.”95 
On the other hand, the OECD in its Issues Paper
96
 tantalises prospective e-businesses 
with salient likely values of e-commerce of $US 650 billion worldwide with some 
projections of up to a ten-fold growth over the next few years. 
However, the OECD then maintain that “[v]isions for the rapid growth of electronic 
commerce are predicated on successful resolution of concerns about the lack of 
adequate infrastructures, skills and capabilities and the security of transacting 
business or interacting with service providers in electronic environments.”97  
Besides the lack of such commitment in developed countries, the OECD points out 
that in the areas of the world for whom globalisation is a key to development,  
“[t]here are differences in business practices, legislative frameworks, infrastructure 
deployment and the general social and economic conditions within countries.”98 
The Economist Intelligence Unit and Pyramid Research have recently introduced a 
concept of  „e-readiness‟, which they define as “… the extent to which a country or 
market‟s business environment is conducive to Internet-based commercial 
opportunities”99. In an appraisal of the world‟s sixty largest economies, Singapore 
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was ranked seventh and Hong Kong thirteenth. China, however, was placed at forty-
fifth position. To contextualise this, India was placed at forty-ninth. The key reason 
for China‟s relatively low position was attributed to the fact that “..poverty, illiteracy 
and infrastructure inadequacies prevent e-business from gaining critical mass..”100  
Ironically, of course, China is reputed to have an internet population of 5.2 million 
which is expected to double to 10.4 million by the end of this year
101
. As Thompson 
notes, however, “[e]-commerce is still in its infancy due to poor quality of service, 
security and the absence of a convenient payment method.”102  President Jiang Zemin 
has nevertheless maintained that “[w]e should recognise the tremendous power of IT 
and vigorously promote its development.”103 The potential danger for China lies 
precisely in the fact that the conduit running between significant financial gain and 
wider internet accessibility is blocked. According to a Chinese government 
spokesperson
104, China‟s credit system is deemed to be chaotic and prone to fraud and 
other crimes. It does not have an electronic currency payment system, it does not have 
a modern goods delivery system and its national information grid is not sufficiently 
large to facilitate the connection of all of its retailers.  
If China‟s internet economy continues to attempt to respond, without the requisite 
security, regulation and infrastructure in situ, to the global pressure to engage in e-
commerce, then the scope for e-commerce abuse will be vast. Reuters has 
commented
105
 upon China‟s requirement for all web sites that provide or release 
information on the World Wide Web to undergo security checks and approval. As 
Reuters notes, "[a]uthorities are anxious not to smother the Internet, keenly aware that 
new information technology is key to China's economic future. Yet they fear an 
information free-flow which could threaten communist control."
106
 Within the context 
of e-commerce development these two concerns remain diametrically opposed. The 
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very nature of the internet and its on-going development and success rests precisely 
upon its actual or perceived extraterritoriality. As Zekos has suggested, "…cyberspace 
cannot be combined in any single territory and assuming that territoriality is the single 
basis for jurisdiction then no state could regulate cyberspace."
107
 Attempts to control 
the sites in this way can only lead to eager business communities both within and 
without Chinese borders disguising their internet sites as something less politically 
overt or, in the case of non-China based sites, carrying on regardless. If legitimate 
businesses do this, illegitimate entities (whether hackers or organised crime groups) 
will capitalise upon such subterfuge simply by attaching themselves to the sites of 
those legitimate but non-sanctioned businesses. Savona, et.al. argue that criminal 
organisations “…go where opportunities are and the process of globalisation helps 
their expansion.”108 Indeed, “[a] wider market in a world afflicted by strong economic 
inequalities means a larger number of occasions for crime against business.”109 
If China maintains a belief that its outlawing of certain sites is effective then such 
infiltration will go unhindered and uncontrolled. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that the 
security breaches discussed elsewhere in this paper have occurred in those 
industrialised nations deemed to be at the very apex of technology.   
 Ironically, the UK government, whose thought process will be replicated by many 
governments, notes the dangers inherent in e-commerce and m-commerce. A 
document produced by the National Infrastructure Security Co-Ordination Centre 
notes that “IT systems in government, business and elsewhere are becoming 
increasingly interconnected, creating national and global IT networks. This opens up 
unprecedented benefits for businesses but at the same time creates new vulnerabilities 
in our IT systems, which could be exploited by the ill-intentioned.”110 The Centre 
argues that “[g]overnment has a responsibility to ensure that protection, proportionate 
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to the threat, is in place for systems critical to national well-being and economic 
prosperity.”111 
How ironic, therefore, that the myriad of businesses and the vast range of computer 
systems and devices they employ are unable or unwilling to cope with the array of 
attacks and intrusions they currently face. They have been driven by the pressure and 
desire to board the e-commerce and m-commerce trains. They have routinely 
underestimated the threats of e-commerce even when such threats were, and continue 
to be, readily identifiable. They seem likely to ignore m-commerce threats altogether 
because common sense tells them that the threat is as yet undeveloped. That will be 
their ultimate downfall and mark the beginning of the end for a successful global 
economy. If China fails to learn, from the previous and on-going experiences of other 
more established economies, of the necessity of placing common sense above 
economic desire, it will lose not only its share of the global e-market but more 
crucially, leave itself open to a sustained and debilitating attack from the criminal 
fraternity from which it will find it extremely difficult to recover. 
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